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Strategic games may exhibit symmetries in a variety of ways. A characteristic feature,
enabling the compact representation of games even when the number of players is
unbounded, is that players cannot, or need not, distinguish between the other players.
We investigate the computational complexity of pure Nash equilibria in four classes
of symmetric games obtained by considering two additional properties: identical payoff
functions for all players and the ability to distinguish oneself from the other players.
In contrast to other types of succinctly representable multi-player games, the pure
equilibrium problem is tractable in all four classes when only a constant number of actions
is available to each player. Identical payoff functions make the difference between TC0-
completeness and membership in AC0, while a growing number of actions renders the
equilibrium problem NP-hard for three of the classes and PLS-hard for the most restricted
class for which the existence of a pure equilibrium is guaranteed. Our results also extend
to larger classes of threshold symmetric games where players are unable to determine the
exact number of players playing a certain action.
© 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
In recent years, the computational complexity of game-theoretic solution concepts, both in cooperative and non-
cooperative game theory, has come under increasing scrutiny. A major obstacle when considering normal-form games with
an unbounded number of players is the exponential size of the explicit representation of the payoffs. More precisely, a gen-
eral game in normal-form with n players and k actions per player comprises n · kn numbers. Computational statements over
such large objects are somewhat dubious for two reasons (cf. [28]). First, the value of eﬃcient, i.e., polynomial-time, algo-
rithms for problems whose input size is already exponential in a natural parameter (the number of players) is questionable.
Secondly, most, if not all, “natural” multi-player games will hardly be given as multi-dimensional payoff matrices but rather
in terms of some more intuitive (and compact) representation. A natural and straightforward way to simplify the repre-
sentation of multi-player games is to somehow formalize similarities between players. As a matter of fact, symmetric games
have been studied since the early days of game theory (e.g., [15,25,34]). The established deﬁnition states that a game is
symmetric if the payoff functions of all players are identical and symmetric in the other players’ actions, i.e., it is impossible
to distinguish between the other players [24,35]. When explicitly looking at multi-player games, there are other conceivable
notions of symmetry. For instance, dropping the requirement of identical payoff functions yields a more general class of
multi-player games that still admit a compact representation.
In this paper, we deﬁne four classes of succinctly representable symmetric multi-player games and study the computa-
tional complexity of ﬁnding pure Nash equilibria in games belonging to these classes. It turns out that in all four classes
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functions for all players further reduce the computational complexity of pure equilibria, an effect that is nulliﬁed as soon
as there are two different payoff functions. The fact that a player cannot (or does not) distinguish himself from the other
players, does not seem to offer any computational advantage. Finally, computing pure equilibria becomes intractable in all
four classes of symmetric games when the number of actions grows at least linearly in the number of players.
Unlike Nash equilibria in mixed strategies, i.e., probabilistic combinations of actions, pure Nash equilibria are not guar-
anteed to exist. If they exist, however, pure equilibria have two distinct advantages over mixed ones. For one, requiring
randomization in order to reach a stable outcome has been criticized on various grounds. In multi-player games, where
action probabilities in equilibrium can be irrational numbers, randomization is particularly questionable. Secondly, pure
equilibria as computational objects are usually much smaller in size than mixed ones.
We assume the reader to be familiar with the well-known chain of complexity classes AC0 ⊂ TC0 ⊆ L ⊆ P ⊆ NP, and
the notions of constant-depth and polynomial-time reducibility (e.g., [7,21,27]). AC0 is the class of problems solvable by
uniform constant-depth Boolean circuits with unbounded fan-in, and TC0 adds so-called threshold gates which output true
if and only if the number of true inputs exceeds a certain threshold. Here, uniformity means that there is an “eﬃcient”
algorithm for constructing, for each input length n, the circuit Cn from the circuit family C = (Cn)n0. Different notions
of eﬃciency give rise to different notions of uniformity [31]. We will consider logspace-uniform circuit families, where
the mapping n → Cn is computable in deterministic logarithmic space. In some of our constructions we use sub-circuits
described by Chandra et al. [7] as basic building blocks. It is easy to see that all these sub-circuits are logspace-uniform.
Finally, L is the class of problems solvable by deterministic Turing machines using only logarithmic space, and P and NP
are the classes of problems that can be solved in polynomial time by deterministic and non-deterministic Turing machines,
respectively. Furthermore, #P is the class of counting problems associated with polynomially balanced polynomial-time
decidable relations. The class PLS of polynomial local search problems and an appropriate notion of reduction [22] will be
introduced as needed.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In the following section, we survey relevant work on symmetric
games, succinct representations, and the computational complexity of pure Nash equilibrium. In Section 3, we then formally
introduce four different notions of symmetry in strategic games and the solution concept of Nash equilibrium. The main
results of this paper, including eﬃcient algorithms as well as hardness results for all four symmetry classes, are given in
Section 4. In Section 5, we provide additional results for a more general notion of symmetry. Section 6 concludes the paper
and points to some open problems.
2. Related work
Symmetries in games have been investigated since the earliest days of game theory. Von Neumann [34] and Morgen-
stern [35] were the ﬁrst to consider symmetries of cooperative games, calling a game in characteristic form symmetric
if the value of a coalition depends only on its size. In the context of two-player (non-cooperative) normal-form games,
the term symmetric is used to refer to games with a skew-symmetric payoff matrix (e.g., [5,15]). Gale et al. [15] pro-
vided a (polynomial-time) reduction from arbitrary games to symmetric games which preserves equilibria. Since ﬁnding
a (possibly mixed) equilibrium in general games has recently been shown PPAD-complete even for games with just two
players [8,10], the same holds for symmetric games as well. The above hardness result has also led to an increased in-
terest in approximate equilibria. In particular, the larger class of anonymous games, allowing different payoff functions for
different players, has been shown to admit an approximation by a factor depending on the Lipschitz constant of the payoff
function and on the square of the number of actions, and a polynomial-time approximation scheme for the case of two
actions [11].
To date, most research on symmetries in games has concentrated on games that require identical payoff functions for
all players, called symmetric games in this paper. One of the reasons for this may have been the strong focus of the early
research in non-cooperative game theory on two-player games, where anonymity as deﬁned in this paper does not impose
any restrictions. An early result by Nash [25] shows that there always exists an equilibrium respecting all symmetries of the
game, which in symmetric games implies the existence of a symmetric equilibrium, i.e., one where all players play the same
(mixed) strategy. Papadimitriou and Roughgarden [28] capitalize on this existence result and show that a Nash equilibrium
of a symmetric game with n players and k actions can be computed in P if k = O (logn/ log logn). While their tractability
results for correlated equilibrium [1] do not rely on identical payoff functions and hence apply to anonymous games as well,
this is not the case for the results about Nash equilibria. The aforementioned existence of symmetric Nash equilibria neither
extends to pure equilibria, nor does it hold for anonymous games. For example, Fig. 3 on page 167 shows an anonymous
game without a symmetric equilibrium.
Obviously, deciding the existence of a pure Nash equilibrium is easy if the number of candidates for such an equilibrium,
i.e., the number of action proﬁles, is polynomial in the size of the game. This is certainly the case for the explicit repre-
sentation of a game as a multi-dimensional table of payoffs, but no longer holds if the game is represented succinctly. For
example, deciding the existence of a pure equilibrium has been shown to be NP-complete for games in graphical normal
form [14,17] or circuit form [33]. Apart from these generic types, many succinct representations are related to symme-
tries in that they exploit some form of independence among certain actions or players playing these actions. In congestion
games [30], the available actions consist of sets of resources, and the payoff depends on the number of other players that
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ﬁnding one is PLS-complete even for symmetric congestion games and in P in the symmetric network case [13]. For single-
ton (or simple) congestion games, where only a single resource can be selected, there is a polynomial-time algorithm for
ﬁnding a social-welfare-maximizing equilibrium [19]. In local-effect games [23], the payoff from an action may also depend
on (a function of) the number of agents playing “neighboring” actions. Unlike congestion games and local-effect games,
action-graph games [3] can encode arbitrary payoffs. For action-graph games of bounded degree, expected payoffs and the
Jacobian of the payoff function can be computed in polynomial time. The latter forms the practical bottleneck step of the
algorithm of Govindan and Wilson [18] for ﬁnding Nash equilibria, but the algorithm may still take exponentially many
steps to converge even for bounded degree. In fact, the pure equilibrium problem is NP-complete for symmetric action-
graph games with bounded degree, but becomes tractable if the treewidth is bounded [20]. In general action-graph games,
the pure equilibrium problem is NP-complete even if the action-graph is a bounded-degree tree [12]. Finally, Brandt et al.
[6] transfer different notions of symmetry to graphical games and obtain mostly negative results concerning the complexity
of pure Nash equilibrium.
3. Preliminaries
In this section, we formally deﬁne essential game-theoretic concepts, introduce four notions of symmetry in strategic
multi-player games, and state several facts concerning these notions.
3.1. Strategic games
An accepted way to model situations of strategic interaction is by means of a normal-form game (e.g., [24]).
Deﬁnition 1 (Normal-form game). A game in normal-form is a tuple Γ = (N, (Ai)i∈N , (pi)i∈N ) where N is a set of players and
for each player i ∈ N , Ai is a non-empty set of actions available to player i, and pi : (×i∈N Ai) → R is a function mapping
each action proﬁle of the game (i.e., combination of actions) to a real-valued payoff for player i.
A combination of actions s ∈×i∈N Ai is also called a proﬁle of pure strategies. This concept can be generalized to (mixed)
strategy proﬁles s ∈ S =×i∈N Si , by letting players randomize over their actions. We have Si denote the set of probability
distributions over player i’s actions, or (mixed) strategies available to player i. We further write n = |N| for the number of
players in a game, si for the ith strategy in proﬁle s, and s−i for the vector of all strategies in s but si .
3.2. Symmetries in multi-player games
Symmetry as a property of a mathematical object typically refers to its invariance under a certain type of transformation.
Symmetries of games usually mean invariance of the payoffs under automorphisms of the set of action proﬁles induced by
some group of permutations of the set of players. Since such an automorphism preserves the number of players that play
a particular action, a characteristic feature of symmetries in games is the inability to distinguish between other players.
Following Daskalakis and Papadimitriou [11] the most general class of games with this property will be called anonymous.
Four different classes of games are obtained by considering two additional characteristics: identical payoff functions for all
players and the ability to distinguish oneself from the other players. The games obtained by adding the former property
will be called symmetric, and presence of the latter will be indicated by the preﬁx “self.” For the obvious reason, we will
henceforth talk about games where the set of actions is the same for all players and write A = A1 = · · · = An and k = |A|,
respectively, to denote this set and its cardinality.
An intuitive way to describe anonymous games is in terms of equivalence classes of the aforementioned automorphism
group, using a notion introduced by Parikh [29] in the context of context-free languages. Given a set A of actions, the
commutative image of an action proﬁle s ∈ AN is given by #(s) = (#(a, s))a∈A where #(a, s) = |{i ∈ N: si = a}|. In other
words, #(a, s) denotes the number of players playing action a in action proﬁle s, and #(s) is the vector of these numbers
for all the different actions. This deﬁnition naturally extends to action proﬁles for subsets of the players.
Deﬁnition 2 (Symmetries). Let Γ = (N, (Ai)i∈N , (pi)i∈N ) be a normal-form game and A a set of actions such that Ai = A for
all i ∈ N . Γ is called
• anonymous if pi(s) = pi(t) for all i ∈ N and all s, t ∈ AN with si = ti and #(s−i) = #(t−i),
• symmetric if pi(s) = p j(t) for all i, j ∈ N and all s, t ∈ AN with si = t j and #(s−i) = #(t− j),
• self-anonymous if pi(s) = pi(t) for all i ∈ N and all s, t ∈ AN with #(s) = #(t), and
• self-symmetric if pi(s) = p j(t) for all i, j ∈ N and all s, t ∈ AN with #(s) = #(t).
When talking about anonymous games, we write pi(si, x−i) to denote the payoff of player i under any action proﬁle s
with #(s−i) = x−i . For self-anonymous games, pi(x) is used to denote the payoff of player i under any proﬁle s with #(s) = x.
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Fig. 2. Relationships between the payoffs of anonymous (Γ1), symmetric (Γ2), self-anonymous (Γ3), and self-symmetric (Γ4) games for n = 3 and k = 2.
Players 1, 2, and 3 simultaneously choose rows, columns, and tables, respectively, and obtain payoffs according to the vector in the resulting cell. Each lower
case letter stands for a payoff value, dots denote arbitrary payoff values. As an example for the separation of the different classes, Γ1 is not symmetric if
a = c and not self-anonymous if b = g . Γ2 is not self-anonymous if b = c. Γ3 is not self-symmetric if a = c.
It is easily veriﬁed that the class of self-symmetric games equals the intersection of symmetric and self-anonymous games,
which in turn are both strictly contained in the class of anonymous games. An illustration of these inclusions is shown
in Fig. 1. Fig. 2 illustrates the different payoff structures for n = 3 and k = 2. In terms of this characterization, a game is
anonymous if the payoff pi(s) of player i ∈ N in action proﬁle s depends, besides his own action si , only on the number
#(a, s−i) of other players playing each of the actions a ∈ A, but not on who plays them. If two players exchange actions,
all other players’ payoffs remain the same. For two-player games, anonymity does not impose any restrictions (action sets
of equal size can simply be achieved by adding dummy actions for one of the players). This may be one of the reasons
why anonymity has not received much attention in the past. A game is symmetric if it is anonymous and if the payoff
function is the same for all players. Hence, if two players exchange actions, their payoffs are also exchanged while all other
players’ payoffs remain the same. Many well-known games like the Prisoner’s Dilemma, Rock-Paper-Scissors, or Chicken
are examples of symmetric (two-player) games. Multi-player simple congestion games [19] are also symmetric. In a self-
anonymous game the payoff of each player depends only on the number #(a, s) of players playing each of the actions a ∈ A,
including the player himself. If two players exchange actions, the payoffs of all players remain the same. Matching Pennies is a
self-anonymous two-player game, voting with identical weights can be seen as an example for the multi-player case. Finally,
in a self-symmetric game the payoff is always the same for all players and stays the same if two players exchange actions.
Self-symmetric games thus are a special case of common payoff (or pure coordination) games, in which every action proﬁle
with maximum payoff is an equilibrium (since no player can gain by deviating). Other games guaranteed to possess a pure
equilibrium, and the complexity of ﬁnding an equilibrium in these games, have been investigated by Fabrikant et al. [13].
Interestingly, the ability to distinguish oneself from the other players does not increase the complexity of the pure
equilibrium problem when players only have two actions.
Lemma 1. When there are only two actions available to each player, there exists an AC0-reduction from anonymous games to self-
anonymous games that preserves pure Nash equilibria and identical payoff functions.
Proof. Let Γ = (N, ({a1,a2})i∈N , (pi)i∈N ) be an anonymous game, and deﬁne a new game Γ ′ = (N, {a1,a2}n, (p′i)i∈N ) such
that for all i ∈ N and for all x ∈ {0,1, . . . ,n − 1},
(1) p′i((x,n − x)) > p′i((x+ 1,n − x− 1)) if and only if pi(a1, (x,n − x− 1)) > pi(a2, (x,n − x− 1)),
(2) p′i((x,n − x)) < p′i((x+ 1,n − x− 1)) if and only if pi(a1, (x,n − x− 1)) < pi(a2, (x,n − x− 1)), and
(3) p′i((x,n − x)) = p′i((x+ 1,n − x− 1)) if and only if pi(a1, (x,n − x− 1)) = pi(a2, (x,n − x− 1)).
Depending on the payoff structure of Γ , it may be necessary to use up to n different payoffs in Γ ′ , even when Γ contains
only two. It is now easily veriﬁed that Γ ′ is self-anonymous in general, and self-symmetric if the original game Γ is
symmetric. It should be noted that this construction cannot in general be extended to games where players have more than
two actions, because it can lead to cyclic preference relations. For example, the symmetric two-player game Rock-Paper-
Scissors cannot be mapped to a corresponding self-symmetric game using the above technique. 
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columns, and tables, respectively. Outcomes are denoted as a vector of payoffs for the three players. Action proﬁles with the same commutative image as
the equilibrium are shaded.
3.3. Nash equilibrium
One of the best-known solution concepts for strategic games is Nash equilibrium [25]. In a Nash equilibrium, no player
is able to increase his payoff by unilaterally changing his strategy.
Deﬁnition 3 (Nash equilibrium). A strategy proﬁle s ∈ S is called a Nash equilibrium if for each player i ∈ N and each strategy
s′i ∈ Si ,
pi(s) pi
((
s−i, s′i
))
.
A Nash equilibrium is called pure if it is a pure strategy proﬁle.
For general games, simply checking the equilibrium condition for each action proﬁle takes time polynomial in the size
of their explicit representation. Using a succinct representation for games where the size of the explicit representation
grows exponentially in the number of players, which is the case for k = 2 already, quickly renders the problem NP-complete
[14,33]. On the other hand, the polynomial size even of the explicit representation for anonymous games with a constant
number of actions might suggest that ﬁnding pure equilibria is easy by a similar argument as above. This reasoning is
ﬂawed, however, since a single entry in the payoff table corresponds to an exponential number of action proﬁles, and it is
very well possible that only a single one of them is an equilibrium while all others are not. The anonymous game given in
Fig. 3 illustrates this fact.
4. Solving anonymous and symmetric games
In this section, we analyze the computational complexity of pure Nash equilibrium in anonymous and symmetric games
with a constant number of actions and a growing number of actions, respectively. We ﬁrst consider games with a constant
number of actions, and show membership of the pure equilibrium problem for complexity classes inside P. We then show
that the same problem becomes NP-hard and PLS-hard, respectively, if the number of actions is not bounded.
4.1. A few words on encodings
Since we are interested in games that model real-world situations, we will henceforth restrict ourselves to games that
can be represented in space polynomial in their natural parameters, like the number of players or actions (cf. [28]). We
will try to characterize games in terms of their natural parameters, while making as few assumptions as possible about any
particular encoding. Apart from hardness results in Section 4.3, which will be shown to extend to games with an exponential
number of players, we assume that the number of players of a game is polynomial in the size of its representation. We
further assume that each player can determine eﬃciently whether a particular action is a best response for a given action
proﬁle of the other players, which obviously is both necessary and suﬃcient for playing a game rationally and eﬃciently at
the same time. Tractability results then hold for any encoding satisfying these properties. Hardness, on the other hand, is
established via some encoding which allows eﬃcient and rational play.
The most basic way to encode a normal-form game is to explicitly write down a multi-dimensional table listing the
payoffs for every single action proﬁle. Certain games can be represented more succinctly because the payoff is the same for
action proﬁles that are equivalent according to some equivalence relation, and needs only be speciﬁed once. For anonymous
games, this equivalence relation is given by the number of players playing each action. The representation that lists the
payoffs for every equivalence class will henceforth be referred to as the explicit representation of an anonymous game. There
are
(n+k−1
k−1
)
distributions of n players among k actions. Since these are exactly the equivalence classes of the set of action
proﬁles for n−1 players under the commutative image, an anonymous game can be represented using at most n ·k · (n+k−2k−1
)
numbers, and is representable using space polynomial in n if and only if k is bounded by a constant. On the other hand,
the size of the game becomes super-polynomial in n even for the slightest growth of k. Nevertheless, space polynomial in n
may still suﬃce to encode certain subclasses of symmetric games with a larger number of actions if we use an implicit
representation of the payoff functions like a Boolean circuit. It is easy to see that for games with a constant number of
actions, any encoding of a game that has size at least linear in the number of players and satisﬁes the above assumption of
rational and eﬃcient play is equivalent to its explicit representation under polynomial-time reductions.
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4.2. Games with a constant number of actions
We begin by investigating games with a constant number of actions. Obviously, solving a game cannot be easier than
playing it optimally given that the opponents’ actions are known. The most interesting upper bounds for the former problem
will thus be obtained when the latter problem is easy. We will therefore assume throughout this section that for any action
proﬁle of his opponents, a player can compute the payoff of a particular action in AC0, i.e., by evaluating a Boolean circuit
with constant depth and bounded fan-in. This particularly holds if the payoff function is given explicitly. It will further
be obvious from the proofs that for payoff functions that are harder to compute, the complexity of the pure equilibrium
problem exactly matches that of computing the payoff function.
As we have noted earlier, the potential hardness of ﬁnding pure equilibria in games with succinct representations stems
from the fact that the number of action proﬁles that are candidates for being an equilibrium is exponential in the size
of the representation of the game. While anonymous games certainly satisfy this property, the pure equilibrium problem
nevertheless turns out to be tractable. The following theorem concerns games where the number of players is polynomial
in the size of the representation.
Theorem 1. Deciding whether an anonymous or self-anonymous game with a constant number of actions has a pure Nash equilibrium
is TC0-complete under constant-depth reducibility. Hardness holds even for games with three different payoffs and two different payoff
functions.
Proof. For membership in TC0, we propose an algorithm that decides whether there exists a pure Nash equilibrium with
a given commutative image. The theorem then follows by observing that the number of different commutative images is
polynomial in the number of players if the number of actions is constant.
Let Γ = (N, (Ai)i∈N , (pi)i∈N ) be an anonymous game, A = {a1,a2, . . . ,ak} a set of actions such that Ai = A for all i ∈ N .
Given the commutative image x = (xa1 , xa2 , . . . , xak ) for some action proﬁle of Γ , call an action a ∈ A a potential best
response for player i in x if xa > 0 and
pi(a, x−) pi(am, x−) for all am ∈ A, (1)
where x− = (xa1 , . . . , xa−1 , xa − 1, xa+1 , . . . , xak ).
Fix a particular commutative image x = (xa1 , xa2 , . . . , xak ), and deﬁne a bipartite graph G = (V , E) such that
V = V1 ∪ V2, V1 = N, V2 =
{
(a j, ): a j ∈ A, 1  x j
}
, and
E = {(i, (a j, )
)
: a j is a potential best response for i under x
}
.
In other words, the two sides of G correspond to players and actions of Γ , respectively, with multiplicities of the actions
chosen according to x. Edges connect each player to his potential best responses. The graph corresponding to the shaded
action proﬁles in Fig. 3 is shown on the left of Fig. 4. It is now readily appreciated that a pure equilibrium of Γ with
commutative image x directly corresponds to a perfect matching of G , and vice versa. Furthermore, by Hall’s theorem, G
has a perfect matching if and only if |ν(V ′)|  |V ′| for all V ′ ⊆ V1, where ν(V ′) = {v ∈ V2: (u, v) ∈ E, u ∈ V1} is the
neighborhood of vertex set V ′ (e.g., [4]).
Observe that Hall’s condition cannot be veriﬁed eﬃciently in general. We will see, however, that this can indeed be done
for G , by considering a new graph obtained from G which possesses only a constant number of vertices. More formally,
assume w.l.o.g. that for all v ∈ V1, ν(v) = ∅, and deﬁne an equivalence relation ∼ ⊆ V × V such that for all v, v ′ ∈ V , v ∼ v ′
if and only if ν(v) = ν(v ′). By construction of G , and since both the number of actions and the number of possible subsets
of actions are constant, the set V /∼ of equivalence classes has constant size, and V /∼ = (V1/∼) ∪ (V2/∼). Each element
of V1/∼ corresponds to the set of players having a particular set of actions as their potential best responses in x. Each
element of V2/∼ corresponds to an action in A. The neighborhood function ν can naturally be extended to equivalence
classes by letting for each U ∈ V1/∼, ν(U ) = {U ′ ∈ V2/∼: v ∈ ν(u) for some u ∈ U , v ∈ U ′}. This yields a bipartite graph
with vertex set V /∼, the graph corresponding to the game in Fig. 3 is shown on the right of Fig. 4. It is now easily veriﬁed
that G has a perfect matching, and Γ a pure equilibrium, if and only if for every Y ⊆ V1/∼, ∑X∈Y |ν(X)| |Y |.
We proceed to show that this property can be veriﬁed by a threshold circuit with unbounded fan-in, constant depth, and
a polynomial number of gates. From the description given below it is easy to see that the constructed circuit is logspace-
uniform. Since V1/∼ has only a constant number of subsets, we can construct a constant depth threshold circuit which
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uses sub-circuits UNARY-COUNT and UNARY-TO-BINARY as described by Chandra et al. [7] to sum over elements of the
equivalence classes, and COMPARISON sub-circuits to verify the inequalities. The former is easily realized with the help of
MAJORITY gates. It thus remains to be shown that for any X ∈ V1/∼, |X | and |ν(X)| can be computed in TC0. For this, recall
that a particular element of V1/∼ corresponds to the set of players that have a certain set of actions as their set of best
responses in x. To compute the number of such players we ﬁrst construct a circuit of constant depth that uses COMPARISON
sub-circuits to check whether Eq. (1) is satisﬁed for a ﬁxed commutative image x, a particular player i ∈ N , and a particular
action a ∈ A. To check whether C ⊆ A is the set of best responses for player i under x, we simply combine the outputs of
the above circuits for all actions a ∈ A into a single AND gate, negating the outputs of circuits for actions a /∈ C . The desired
number of players is then obtained by adding up the outputs of these gates for all players i ∈ N , again using UNARY-COUNT
sub-circuits. On the other hand, |ν(X)| corresponds to the number of players bound to play an action from a certain subset
in every action proﬁle with commutative image x, and can easily be obtained by summing over the respective elements
of x.
For hardness, we reduce the problem of deciding whether exactly  bits of a string of m bits are 1 to deciding the
existence of a pure equilibrium in a self-anonymous game. Hardness of the former problem is immediate from that of
MAJORITY (e.g., [7]). For a particular m-bit string b, we deﬁne a game Γ with m+ 2 players of two different types 0 and 1
and actions A = {0,1}. The ith player of Γ is of type 0 or 1 if the ith bit of b is 0 or 1, respectively. Player m+1 is of type 0,
player m + 2 is of type 1. The payoffs p0 and p1 for the two types are given in Fig. 5, the column labeled j speciﬁes the
payoff when exactly j players, including the player himself, play action 1. It is easily veriﬁed that this is an AC0 reduction.
We claim that Γ possesses a pure equilibrium if and only if exactly  bits of b are 1. We observe the following:
• An action proﬁle s cannot be an equilibrium of Γ if #(1, s) = + 1. In this case, the players of one of the two types get
a higher payoff at both #(1, s) − 1 and #(1, s) + 1, or at one of these in case #(1, s) = 0 and #(1, s) =m + 2. Since by
construction we have at least one player of each type, there always exists a player who can change his action to get a
higher payoff.
• If there are  + 1 players of type 1, the action proﬁle where all players of type 0 play action 0 and all players of type 1
play action 1 is an equilibrium. None of the players of type 0 can gain by changing his action to 1, and none of them
can change his action to 0 (because all of them already play 0). A symmetric condition holds for players of type 1.
• In turn, if the number of players of type 1 does not equal  + 1, an action proﬁle s with #(1, s) =  + 1 cannot be an
equilibrium. In this case, there must be (i) a player of type 0 playing action 1 in s, or (ii) a player of type 1 playing 0.
This player can change his action to get a higher payoff.
Hence, a pure equilibrium exists if and only if there are  + 1 players of type 1, i.e., if and only if b has  1-bits. This
completes the reduction. 
In contrast to anonymous games, if s is a pure equilibrium of a symmetric game, so are all t satisfying #(t) = #(s).
This is due to the fact that the payoff functions of all players, and thus the situation of all players playing the same action
a ∈ A, is identical, as would be the situation of any other player exchanging actions with someone playing a. We exploit this
property to show that deciding the existence of a pure equilibrium in symmetric games with a constant number of actions
is strictly easier than for anonymous and self-anonymous games.
Theorem 2. The problem of deciding whether a symmetric game with a constant number of actions has a pure Nash equilibrium is
in AC0.
Proof. Like with anonymous games, an action proﬁle s is an equilibrium of a symmetric game if and only if, for all i ∈ N , si
is a best response to #(s−i), i.e., if
pi
(
si,#(s−i)
)
 pi
(
a,#(s−i)
)
for all a ∈ A. (2)
For a particular player i ∈ N and for constant k, checking this inequality requires only a constant number of comparisons
and can be done using a circuit of constant depth and polynomial size (e.g., [7]). When it comes to checking Eq. (2) for
the different players, the observation about action proﬁles with identical commutative images affords us a considerable
computational advantage as compared to, say, anonymous or self-anonymous games. More precisely, we only have to check
if Eq. (2) is satisﬁed for a player playing a certain action, of which there are at most k. Again, this can be done using a circuit
of constant depth and polynomial size if k is a constant.
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The reasoning in the proof of Theorem 2 also provides a nice illustration of the fact that every symmetric game with
two actions possesses a pure equilibrium, as recently shown by Cheng et al. [9]. In the case of two actions, pi depends
only on player i’s action (0 or 1) and on the number of other players playing action 1. A pure equilibrium exists if for
some m neither the players playing 0 (who see m players playing 1) nor the players playing 1 (who see m− 1 other players
playing 1) have an incentive to deviate, i.e., pi(0,m) pi(1,m) and pi(1,m − 1) pi(0,m − 1). For m = 0 and m = n, one
of the conditions is trivially satisﬁed, because there are no players playing 1 or 0, respectively. It is now straightforward
to show that at least one such m must exist. Alternatively, the existence of pure equilibria in symmetric games with two
actions can also be obtained as an immediate consequence of Lemma 1. We can transform every symmetric game with two
actions into a self-symmetric game with the same set of equilibria, and every game in the latter class is guaranteed to have
at least one pure equilibrium.
As stated earlier, self-symmetric games always possess a pure equilibrium, namely an action proﬁle with maximum
payoff for every player. We proceed to show that such an action proﬁle, which has the additional property of maximizing
social welfare, i.e., the sum of all players’ payoffs, can be found in AC0.
Theorem 3. The problem of ﬁnding a social-welfare-maximizing pure Nash equilibrium of a self-symmetric game with a constant
number of actions is in AC0.
Proof. Since self-symmetric games belong to the class of common payoff games, any action proﬁle with maximum payoff
(for all players) is a social-welfare-maximizing equilibrium (and Pareto dominates any other strategy proﬁle). Finding such
an equilibrium is thus equivalent to ﬁnding the maximum of
(n+k−2
k−1
)
integers. The exact number is irrelevant as long as it is
polynomial in the size of the input, which is certainly the case if k is bounded by a constant. Chandra et al. [7] have shown
that the maximum of m m-bit binary numbers can be computed by an unbounded fan-in, constant-depth Boolean circuit of
size polynomial in m. Since m is of course polynomial in the size of the input, the size of this circuit is as well. 
4.3. Games with a growing number of actions
The proofs we have seen so far could exploit the fact that for constant k the explicit representation of an anonymous
game is equivalent, under the appropriate type of reduction, to any kind of payoff function computable in a particular com-
plexity class inside P. This need no longer be the case for unbounded k, because then the size of the explicit representation
grows exponentially in n. Such games may of course still admit a polynomial representation, for example if payoff functions
are encoded by a Boolean circuit. We will now show that deciding the existence of a pure equilibrium in anonymous, sym-
metric, and self-anonymous games becomes NP-hard if the number of actions grows in n. For self-symmetric games, which
always have a pure equilibrium, the associated search problem will be shown to be PLS-hard. In particular, we show NP-
completeness and PLS-completeness, respectively, for games that have a polynomial number of players—like those covered
by Theorems 1 and 2—and a number of actions that grows linearly in the number of players. It will be obvious from the
proofs that hardness for the respective classes also holds for games with an exponential number of players and logarithmic
growth of the number of actions. The corresponding case with a constant number of actions, on the other hand, remains
open.
If the number of actions in a game is large enough, they can in principle be used to distinguish the players playing them.
We will exploit this fact and prove the following theorems by reductions from satisﬁability of a Boolean circuit. For this,
recall that circuit satisﬁability (CSAT), i.e., deciding whether a Boolean circuit has a satisfying assignment, is NP-complete
(e.g., [27]). We provide a reduction from CSAT to the problem of deciding the existence of a pure equilibrium in a special
class of games. For a particular circuit C with inputs M = {1,2, . . . ,m}, we deﬁne a game Γ with at least m players and
actions A = {a0j ,a1j : j ∈ M} ∪ {b}. An action proﬁle s of Γ where #(a0j , s) + #(a1j , s) = 1 for all j ∈ M , i.e., one where exactly
one action of each pair a0j , a
1
j is played, directly corresponds to an assignment c of C , the jth bit of this assignment being 1
if and only if a1j is played. Observe that in this case the auxiliary action b has to be played by exactly n −m players. We
can thus distinguish the action proﬁles of Γ corresponding to a satisfying assignment of C from those corresponding to a
non-satisfying assignment and those not corresponding to an assignment at all.
Theorem 4. Deciding whether a self-anonymous game has a pure Nash equilibrium is NP-complete, even if the number of actions is
linear in the number of players and there is only a constant number of different payoffs.
Proof. Membership in NP is obvious. Since the number of players is polynomial, we can simply guess an action proﬁle and
verify that it satisﬁes the equilibrium condition.
For hardness, we reduce satisﬁability of a Boolean circuit C with inputs M = {1,2, . . . ,m} to the existence of a pure
equilibrium in a game Γ with nm players, actions A = {a0,a1: j ∈ M} ∪ {b}, and payoff functions pi as follows:j j
F. Brandt et al. / Journal of Computer and System Sciences 75 (2009) 163–177 171• If s corresponds to a satisfying assignment of C , we let pi(s) = 1 for all i ∈ N .
• Otherwise we let
· p1(s) = 1, p2(s) = 0 if #(b, s) is even,
· p1(s) = 0, p2(s) = 1 if #(b, s) is odd, and
· pi(s) = 1 for all i ∈ N \ {1,2}.
We observe the following:
• In all of the above cases, the payoff of player i only depends on the number of players playing certain actions. If two
players exchange actions, the payoff to all players remains the same. Hence, Γ is self-anonymous.
• Clearly, every action proﬁle s corresponding to a satisfying assignment of C is an equilibrium, because in this case all
players receive the maximum payoff of 1.
• For an action proﬁle s not corresponding to a satisfying assignment of C , either player 1 or player 2 receives a payoff
of 0. Furthermore, by choosing his own action to be either b or some other action, this player can determine the parity
of the number of players playing b. Changing the parity strictly increases the player’s payoff. This means that s cannot
be an equilibrium.
We have hence established a direct correspondence between satisfying assignments of C and pure equilibria of Γ . The
transformation from C to Γ essentially works by writing down Boolean circuits that compute pi . Observing that this can be
done in time polynomial in the size of C if n 2k , where k = |A|, completes the proof. 
As the reader may have noticed, the construction used in this proof has players 1 and 2 play Matching Pennies in the case
where the Boolean circuit is not satisﬁed. Not only is this game a well-known example for a game that does not possess
a pure equilibrium, it is also self-anonymous on its own. On the other hand, it is readily appreciated that the payoffs in
this game do depend on the identities of the players, i.e., the game is not symmetric. We will have to avail of a different
construction for the symmetric case.
Theorem 5. Deciding whether a symmetric game has a pure Nash equilibrium is NP-complete, even if the number of actions is linear
in the number of players and there is only a constant number of different payoffs.
Proof. Membership in NP is again obvious.
For hardness, we provide a reduction from CSAT, mapping a circuit C with inputs M = {1,2, . . . ,m} to a game Γ with
nm players, actions A = {a0j ,a1j : j ∈ M} ∪ {b}, and payoff functions pi as follows:
• If s corresponds to a satisfying assignment of C , we let pi(s) = 2 for all i ∈ N .
• If s does not correspond to a satisfying assignment of C , we distinguish three different cases according to the number
#(b, s) of players playing action b:
· If #(b, s) < n −m, we let pi(s) = 1 if si = b, and pi(s) = 0 otherwise.
· If #(b, s) > n −m, we let pi(s) = 0 if si = b, and pi(s) = 1 otherwise.
· Finally, if #(b, s) = n −m, we let
pi(s) = 2 if si = a1j for some j ∈ M , #(a0j , s) > 0, and #(a1j , s) > 0,
pi(s) = 1 if si = a0j for some j ∈ M , #(a0j , s) > 0, and #(a1j , s) = 0, and
pi(s) = 0 otherwise.
We observe the following:
• For all of the above cases, the payoff of player i only depends on his own action and on the number of players playing
certain other actions. If two players exchange actions, their payoffs are also exchanged. Hence, Γ is symmetric.
• Clearly, any action proﬁle corresponding to a satisfying assignment of C is an equilibrium, because in this case all
players receive the maximum payoff of 2.
• On the other hand, if s does not correspond to a satisfying assignment, we have one of three different cases, in none of
which s is an equilibrium:
· If #(b, s) < n−m or #(b, s) > n−m+ 1, then there exists a player that receives payoff 0 and can change his action to
receive a payoff of 1.
· If #(a0j , s) = 1 for all j ∈ M , which can only be the case if #(b, s) < n −m, player i can change to some a1m such that
si = a0m to increase his payoff from 1 to 2.
· Otherwise, there has to be some player i ∈ N who gets payoff 0, and, by the pigeonhole principle, some j ∈ M such
that #(a0j , s−i) = #(a1j , s−i) = 0. Then, player i can change to a0j to get a higher payoff.
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from C to Γ essentially works by writing down Boolean circuits that compute pi . Observing that this can be done in time
polynomial in the size of C if n 2k , where k = |A|, completes the proof. 
By each of the previous two theorems and by the inclusion relationships between the different classes of games, we also
have the following.
Corollary 1. Deciding whether an anonymous game has a pure Nash equilibrium is NP-complete, even if the number of actions is linear
in the number of players and there is only a constant number of different payoffs.
Since the proofs of Theorems 4 and 5 work by mapping satisfying assignments of a Boolean circuit to a certain number of
pure equilibria of a strategic game, we can show that counting the number of pure equilibria in the above classes of games
is hard.
Corollary 2. For anonymous, symmetric, and self-anonymous games, counting the number of pure Nash equilibria is #P-hard, even if
the number of actions is linear in the number of players and there is only a constant number of different payoffs.
Proof. Recall that in the proof of Theorem 4, actions of the game Γ are identiﬁed with inputs of the Boolean circuit C .
As a direct consequence of anonymity or symmetry, it does not matter which player plays a particular action to assign a
value to the corresponding gate. Every satisfying assignment of C thus corresponds to n! equilibria of Γ , so the number
of satisfying assignments can be determined by counting the number of pure equilibria, of which there are at most 2nn!,
and dividing this number by n!. Division of two m-bit binary numbers can be done using a circuit with bounded fan-in and
depth O (logm) [2]. For m = log(2nn!) = O (n2), we have depth O (logn2) = O (logn), so the above division can be carried out
in NC1. We have thus found a reduction of the problem #SAT of counting the number of satisfying assignments of C , which
is #P-complete (e.g., [27]), to the problem of counting the pure equilibria of Γ . The same line of reasoning applies to the
proof of Theorem 5. Analogously to Corollary 1, #P-hardness extends to anonymous games. 
As we have already outlined above, every self-symmetric game possesses a pure equilibrium. Theorem 3 states that
ﬁnding even a social-welfare-maximizing equilibrium is very easy as long as the number of actions is bounded by a constant.
If now the number of actions is growing but polynomial in the size of the input, we can start at an arbitrary action proﬁle
and check in polynomial time whether some player can change his action to increase the (common) payoff. If this is not
the case, we have found an equilibrium. Otherwise, we can repeat the process for the new proﬁle, resulting in a procedure
called best-response dynamics in game theory. Since the payoff strictly increases in each step, we are guaranteed to ﬁnd
an equilibrium in polynomial time if the number of different payoffs is polynomial. Conversely, we will show that, given
a self-symmetric game with a growing number of actions and an exponential number of different payoffs, ﬁnding a pure
equilibrium is at least as hard as ﬁnding a locally optimal solution to an NP-hard optimization problem. For this, we formally
introduce the class of search problems for which a solution is guaranteed to exist by a local optimality argument.
Deﬁnition 4 (Local search, PLS). A local search problem is given by (i) a set I of instances, (ii) a set F(x) of feasible solutions
for each x ∈ I , (iii) an integer measure μ(S, x) for each S ∈ F(x), and (iv) a set N (S, x) of neighboring solutions for each
S ∈ F(x). A solution is locally optimal if it does not have a strictly better neighbor, i.e., one with a higher or lower measure
depending on the kind of optimization problem.
A local search problem is in the class PLS of polynomial local search problems [22] if for every x ∈ I there exist polynomial
time algorithms for (i) computing an initial feasible solution in F(x), (ii) computing the measure μ(S, x) of a solution S ∈ F ,
and (iii) determining that S is locally optimal or ﬁnding a better solution in N (S, x).
A problem P in PLS is PLS-reducible to another problem Q in PLS if there exist polynomial time computable functions Φ
and Ψ mapping (i) instances x of P to instances Φ(x) of Q and (ii) solutions S of an instance Φ(x) of Q to solutions Ψ (S, x)
of the corresponding instance x of P such that locally optimal solutions are mapped to locally optimal solutions.
Interestingly, problems in PLS have a fully polynomial-time approximation scheme [26].
The proof of the following theorem works along similar lines as those of Theorems 4 and 5 to give a reduction from the
PLS-complete problem FLIP.
Theorem 6. The problem of ﬁnding a pure Nash equilibrium in a self-symmetric game is PLS-complete, even if the number of actions is
linear in the number of players.
Proof. Neighborhood among action proﬁles is given by a single player changing his action. Since the number of players and
actions is polynomial in the input size, and since the payoff function is computable in polynomial time, membership in PLS
is immediate.
F. Brandt et al. / Journal of Computer and System Sciences 75 (2009) 163–177 173For hardness, consider a Boolean circuit C with inputs M = {1,2, . . . ,m} and  outputs. Finding an assignment such that
the output interpreted as an -bit binary number is a local maximum under the FLIP neighborhood (i.e., changing a single
input bit) is known to be PLS-complete [22,32]. We provide a PLS reduction to the problem of ﬁnding a pure equilibrium
in a self-symmetric game by mapping a particular circuit C as described above to a game Γ with n m players, actions
A = {a0j ,a1j : j ∈ M}, and a (common) payoff function p as follows:
• If s corresponds to an assignment c of C , we let p(s) = n + C(c), where C(c) denotes the output of C for input c,
interpreted as a binary number.
• Otherwise, we let p(s) = min(#(b, s),n −m) + |{ j ∈ M: #(a0j , s) + #(a1j , s) > 0}|. That is, the payoff is at most n− 1 and
decreases in the minimum number of players that would have to change their action in order to make s correspond to
an assignment of C .
We observe the following:
• Obviously, Γ is a common payoff game. Since p is invariant under any permutation of the players in both of the above
cases, Γ is self-symmetric.
• If n  2k , where k = |A|, a Boolean circuit that computes p can be constructed from C in time polynomial in the size
of C . Hence, there exists a polynomial time computable function that maps instances of FLIP to instances of the problem
under consideration.
• An action proﬁle a that does not correspond to an assignment of C cannot be an equilibrium of Γ . In this case there
always exists j ∈ M such that a0j and a1j are played by more than one player. At the same time, less than n −m players
play b, or no one plays a0j′ or a
1
j′ for some j
′ ∈ M . If one of the players playing the former changes to the latter, he gets
a higher payoff (actually, all players do).
• There is a direct correspondence between the FLIP neighborhood of C and a single player changing between a0j and a1j
for some j ∈ M . Furthermore, changing to an action proﬁle that does not correspond to an assignment of C will get
the player strictly less payoff. Thus, there is a direct correspondence between pure equilibria of Γ and local maxima
of C under the FLIP neighborhood. Obviously, the assignment corresponding to an action proﬁle can be computed in
polynomial time, if such an assignment exists. The conditions of Deﬁnition 4 do not require that we map solutions
of Γ that are not locally optimal to solutions of C that are not locally optimal. This means that action proﬁles not
corresponding to an assignment can simply be mapped to an arbitrary assignment.
It is easily veriﬁed that this satisﬁes the properties of a PLS reduction. 
Implicit in the deﬁnition of PLS is a standard algorithm for ﬁnding a locally optimal solution for a given input x ∈ I:
start with an arbitrary feasible solution S ∈ F(x) and repeatedly ﬁnd a strictly better neighbor until a locally optimal
solution T ∈ F(x) has been found. The standard algorithm problem can be phrased as follows: given x, ﬁnd the locally optimal
solution T output by the standard algorithm on input x. Schäffer and Yannakakis [32] introduce the notion of a tight PLS
reduction and show that tight reductions preserve both hardness of the standard algorithm problem and exponential worst-
case running time of the standard algorithm.
Deﬁnition 5 (Tight PLS reduction). Let P , Q be PLS problems. A PLS reduction (Φ,Ψ ) from P to Q is called tight if for any
instance x of P there exists a set R ⊆ F(Φ(x)) with the following properties:
(1) R contains all local optima of Φ(x).
(2) For every p ∈ F(x), a solution q ∈ R satisfying Ψ (q, x) = p can be computed in polynomial time.
(3) Consider q0,q1, . . . ,q ∈ F(Φ(x)) such that q0,q ∈ R, qi /∈ R for all 0 < i < , qi+1 ∈ N (qi,Φ(x)) for all i < , and
μ(qi) > μ(q j) if i > j. Let p = Ψ (q0, x), p′ = Ψ (q, x). Then, either p = p′ or p′ ∈ N (p, x).
With some extra work, we can show that the reduction used in the proof of Theorem 6 is tight, and draw additional
conclusions about the standard algorithm and the standard algorithm problem.
Corollary 3. The standard algorithm for ﬁnding pure Nash equilibria in self-symmetric games has an exponential worst-case running
time. The standard algorithm problem is NP-hard.
Proof. Johnson et al. [22] have shown that the standard algorithm for FLIP has an exponential worst-case running time,
and the standard algorithm problem is NP-hard. By Lemma 3.3 of Schäffer and Yannakakis [32] it thus suﬃces to show
that the reduction in the proof of Theorem 6 is tight. To this end, choose R to be the set of actions proﬁles of Γ that
correspond to an assignment of C . Obviously, R contains all optimal solutions, and a payoff proﬁle corresponding to a
particular assignment can be computed in polynomial time. The third condition is trivially satisﬁed because the measure of
any solution inside R is strictly greater than that of any solution outside of R. 
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algorithm, and NP-hardness of the standard algorithm problem can also be shown for general (i.e., not necessarily symmet-
ric) common payoff games with k = 2. This fact nicely illustrates the inﬂuence of symmetry on the hardness of ﬁnding, or
deciding the existence of, a pure equilibrium.
5. Threshold symmetries
In order to extend the basic concept of symmetry as the indistinguishability of players, we will now consider games
where the players cannot even observe the exact number of players playing a certain action, but only whether this number
reaches certain thresholds. Let Γ = (N, (Ai)i∈N , (pi)i∈N ) be a normal-form game and A a set of actions such that Ai = A for
all i ∈ N . For T ⊆ {1,2, . . . ,n}, let ∼T ⊆ AN × AN be deﬁned as follows: s ∼T t if for all a ∈ A and all x ∈ T , #(a, s) < x if and
only if #(a, t) < x. ∼T naturally extends to action proﬁles for subsets of N . It is easily veriﬁed that for any T ⊆ {1,2, . . . ,n},
∼T is an equivalence relation on the set AM of action proﬁles for players M ⊆ N . We use ∼T to generalize Deﬁnition 2.
Deﬁnition 6 (Threshold symmetry). Let Γ = (N, (Ai)i∈N , (pi)i∈N ) be a normal-form game, A a set of actions such that Ai = A
for all i ∈ N . Let T ⊆ {1,2, . . . ,n}. Γ is called
• T -anonymous if pi(s) = pi(t) for all i ∈ N and all s, t ∈ AN with si = ti and s−i ∼T t−i ,
• T -symmetric if pi(s) = p j(t) for all i, j ∈ N and all s, t ∈ AN with si = t j and s−i ∼T t− j ,
• T -self-anonymous if pi(s) = pi(t) for all i ∈ N and all s, t ∈ AN with s ∼T t , and
• T -self-symmetric if pi(s) = p j(t) for all i, j ∈ N and all s, t ∈ AN with s ∼T t .
For T = {1,2, . . . ,n}, these classes are equivalent to those of Deﬁnition 2. Moreover, we obtain Boolean symmetry, where
payoffs only depend on the support of an action proﬁle (i.e., the actions that are played by at least one player), for T = {1}.
In general, we call a game threshold anonymous (for one of the above classes) if it is T -anonymous for some T (and the
corresponding class).
Obviously, the number of payoffs that need to be written down for each player to specify a general T -anonymous
game is exactly the number of equivalence classes of ∼T for action proﬁles of the other players. A T -anonymous game
can be represented using at most n · k · |An−1/∼T | numbers, where X/∼ denotes the quotient set of set X by equivalence
relation ∼. For Boolean anonymity, the number of equivalence classes equals the number of k-bit binary numbers where at
least one bit is 1, i.e., 2k − 1. More generally, there cannot be more than (|T | + 1)k equivalence classes if |T | is bounded by
a constant (since for every action, the number of players playing this action must be between two thresholds), while for
T = {n} there are as few as k+ 1. Hence, any T -anonymous game with constant |T | is representable using space polynomial
in n if k = O (logn). It does not matter if the thresholds themselves are constant or not. We are now ready to identify a
class of threshold symmetric games for which the pure equilibrium problem is tractable. It should be noted that the proof
technique is not limited to this particular class, but in fact applies to the larger class of games for which the kernel of the
best response function has polynomial size.
Theorem 7. For threshold anonymous games with k = O (logn) and a constant number of thresholds, deciding the existence of a pure
Nash equilibrium is in P.
Proof. Like in the proof of Theorem 1, we provide an algorithm that checks whether there is an equilibrium in a particular
equivalence class X ∈ AN/∼T . Since for k = O (logn) and |T | = O (1), the cardinality of AN/∼T is polynomial in n, it suﬃces
to show that the algorithm requires only polynomial time for every such set. For a particular element X ∈ AN/∼T , the
algorithm is again divided into two phases: (i) computing the set of best responses for each player under X , and (ii) checking
whether there is a particular action proﬁle s ∈ X where each player plays a best response.
In the ﬁrst phase, and unlike the case T = {1,2, . . . ,n} covered by Theorem 1, the action a played by player i ∈ N may or
may not yield a different element of AN\{i}/∼T against which a should be a best response. Instead of just looking for best re-
sponses under elements of T N , we thus look for best responses under those of UN , where U = {u  n: u ∈ T or (u − 1) ∈ T }.
Since the cardinalities of both UN and of the set of possible best responses is polynomial if |T | = O (1) and k = O (logn),
the ﬁrst phase requires only polynomial time.
As for the second phase, we show that it can be reduced to deciding the existence of an integer ﬂow with upper and
lower bounds in a directed network with O (2k) vertices. Since this problem is in P if the number of vertices is polynomial
(e.g., [16]), observing that 2k is polynomial in the size of the input if k = O (logn) completes the proof. Fix X ∈ AN/∼T and
deﬁne a directed graph G = (V , E) such that
V = {s, t, t′} ∪ V1 ∪ V2, V1 = 2A, V2 = A, and
E = {s} × V1 ∪
{
(A′,a) ∈ V1 × V2: a ∈ A′
}∪ V2 × {t} ∪
{
(t, t′)
}
.
Further deﬁne two functions  : E → N and u : E → N such that,
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for all A′ ∈ V1,
(s, A′) = u(s, A′) = ∣∣{ i ∈ N: A′ is the set of best responses of i under X}∣∣,
for all A′ ∈ V1 and a ∈ A′, (A′,a) = 0 and u(A′,a) = n,
for all a ∈ V2, (a, t) = min
x∈X #(a, x) and u(a, t) = maxx∈X #(a, x), and
(t, t′) = u(t, t′) = n.
Fig. 6 shows the ﬂow network for the game in Fig. 3. Edge capacities have been computed by checking for each player if
his action in the respective (shaded) action proﬁle of Fig. 3 is a best response. Observe that since this game is not only
threshold anonymous but also anonymous, upper and lower bounds are the same for ﬂow leaving vertices in V2 = A.
Obviously every feasible ﬂow from s to t′ must have size n. Furthermore, the conditions for ﬂow leaving vertices in V1
require that there exists an assignment of actions to players such that each player plays a best response, while those for
ﬂow leaving edges in V2 require that the resulting action proﬁle is an element of X . It is thus readily appreciated that a
ﬂow from s to t′ satisfying lower bounds  and upper bounds u directly corresponds to a Nash equilibrium of Γ , and vice
versa. 
On the other hand, it is rather straightforward to modify the games deﬁned in the proofs of Theorems 4, 5, and 6 to be
Boolean if n = k. We obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 4.Deciding the existence of a pure Nash equilibrium is NP-hard for threshold anonymous, threshold symmetric, and threshold
self-anonymous games, even if thresholds are Boolean, the number of actions is linear in the number of players, and there is only a
constant number of different payoffs. For the same classes, counting the number of pure Nash equilibria is #P-hard.
For threshold self-symmetric games, ﬁnding a pure Nash equilibrium is PLS-hard, even if thresholds are Boolean and the number of
actions is linear in the number of players.
Proof. In all constructions, we assume n = m and remove the auxiliary action b. In addition to that, the self-anonymous
game used in the proof of Theorem 4 is modiﬁed by letting players 1 and 2 play Matching Pennies on the parity of the
number |{ j ∈ M: #(a0j , s) > 0}| of 0-actions that are played by at least one player. It is easily veriﬁed that the arguments
used to show the correspondence between satisfying assignments of the Boolean circuit and pure equilibria of the respective
game still go through. Furthermore, the payoff of a particular player in each of these games only depends on whether certain
actions are played by at least one player and, potentially, on the player’s own action. 
6. Conclusion and future work
In this paper, we have introduced four notions of symmetry in strategic multi-player games and investigated the compu-
tational complexity of ﬁnding pure Nash equilibria. We established that this problem is tractable for games with a constant
number of actions, but intractable if the number of actions grows at least linearly in the number of players. It is worth not-
ing that, for games with a constant number of actions, the pure equilibrium problem happens to lie in NC1 for all symmetry
types and is thus open to parallel computation. For games with an exponential number of players in which the number of
actions grows sub-logarithmically, the complexity remains open. The main results are summarized in Table 1.
In future work, it would be interesting to extend our tractability results to larger classes of games. For example, games
with a certain number of player types, where indistinguishability holds only for players of the same type, can be obtained
by restricting Deﬁnition 2 to permutations that map players from a certain subset to players of the same set. Given a game
in this class, we can construct an anonymous game with the same set of players and an action set that is the Cartesian
product of the original set of actions and the set of player types. By assigning a unique minimum payoff to all actions not
corresponding to the type of the respective player, we can ensure that players only play actions corresponding to their type
in every equilibrium of the new game, effectively allowing us to distinguish players of different types in the new game.
For games with a constant number of players the size of the new game is polynomial in the size of the original game, and
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Complexity of pure Nash equilibrium in symmetric games.
k = O (1) k = O (n)
anonymous TC0-complete NP-hard
self-anonymous TC0-complete NP-hard
symmetric in AC0 NP-hard
self-symmetric in AC0 PLS-hard
the tractability result of Theorem 1 carries over immediately. A different notion, such that players of the same type have
identical payoff functions, does not seem to provide additional structure. As we have already shown, only two different
payoff functions suﬃce to make the pure equilibrium problem TC0-hard for a constant number of actions and NP-hard for a
growing number of actions. More generally, one might investigate games where payoffs are invariant under particular sets
of permutations. For example, von Neumann and Morgenstern [35] regard the number of permutations under which the
payoffs of a game are invariant as a measure for the degree of symmetry. The question is in how far the computational
complexity of solving a game depends on the degree of symmetry.
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